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Abstract  The  institution-based  view  of  strategy  has  emerged  as  a  leading  perspective  in  Strate-
gic Management.  It  incorporates  the  institutional  dimension  when  offering  relevant  answers  to
the fundamental  questions  of  strategy.  One  of  the  challenges  of  this  perspective  is  to  develop
stronger measures  of  institutions  (Peng  et  al.,  2009).  This  paper  seeks  to  contribute  in  this
direction by  offering  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  main  measures  of  institutions  that  previous
works in  Strategic  Management  have  used.  Our  aim  is  to  offer  a  guide  that  will  help  researchers
to decide  how  they  should  incorporate  the  institutional  dimension  into  their  empirical  work.
© 2012  ACEDE.  Published  by  Elsevier  España,  S.L.  All  rights  reserved.Informal  institutions;
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he  ﬁeld  of  Strategic  Management  has  been  traditionally
overned  by  two  big  paradigms.  While  the  1980s  were  char-
cterized  by  the  dominance  of  the  industry-based  view
Porter,  1980),  the  1990s  were  clearly  the  decade  of  the
esource-based  view  of  the  ﬁrm  (Barney,  1991).  In  recent
ecades,  the  two  perspectives  have  moved  like  swings  of  a
endulum  in  the  search  for  the  answers  to  the  fundamental
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ears,  a  third  leading  perspective  seems  to  have  conditioned
he  movement  of  the  pendulum  between  these  two  impor-
ant  frameworks  and  has  emerged  in  Strategic  Management:
he  institution-based  view  (Peng  et  al.,  2009).  This  per-
pective,  with  roots  in  both  the  economic  --  institutional
conomics  --  (North,  1990;  Williamson,  1985)  and  sociologi-
al  --  institutional  theory  --  literature  (DiMaggio  and  Powell,
983;  Scott,  1995),  incorporates  the  role  of  institutions
n  understanding  why  ﬁrms  differ  in  terms  of  competitive
dvantage.On  the  one  hand,  its  emergence  responds  to  external
ressures  from  the  new  institutionalism  movement  in  the
ocial  sciences  in  recent  decades  (North,  1990;  Scott,  1995;
eng  et  al.,  2009).  On  the  other,  its  appearance  seems
served.
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The  institution-based  view  of  strategy  is  the  result  of
a  consideration  of  both  these  streams  of  research  in  the
context  of  business  strategy.  It  conceives  strategic  choices
1 For a more detailed review of the link between transaction costs
economics and the old and new institutionalism in the ﬁrm organi-
zational adaptation, see Greenwood and Hinings (1996) and Roberts
and Greenwood (1997).
2 As one anonymous referee points out, it is necessary to highlight
the importance that the sociological view has for strategy. For exam-
ple, the idea of organizational isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell,
1983) has frequently been used with diverse objectives. Although
the emphasis has traditionally been on the tendency of organiza-
tions to become similar, some authors (see Hambrick et al., 2005,
for example) argue that, in fact, the factors proposed by DiMaggioThe  institution-based  view  of  strategy:  How  to  measure  it  
to  obey  internal  forces  within  the  Strategic  Management
domain.  In  particular,  the  lack  of  attention  to  certain  macro-
contextual  aspects  by  the  industry  and  resource-based  views
has  been  important  to  promote  the  institutional  perspec-
tive.  The  recognition  of  the  relevance  of  institutions  for
competitive  advantage  is  important  so  that  they  cease  to
be  treated  as  background  conditions  or  control  variables
(Peng  et  al.,  2008).  This  recognition  is  also  strongly  related
to  Bamberger’s  (2008)  claim  for  a  more  formal  inclusion  of
contextual  factors  (e.g.  institutions)  in  existing  models  that
attempt  to  further  advance  management  theories.
In  the  last  decade,  the  institution-based  view  has
been  mainly  used  in  the  international  business  literature
(Peng  et  al.,  2008;  Peng,  2009),  particularly  in  the  study
of  emerging  economies  (Cuervo-Cazurra  and  Genc,  2011;
Cuervo-Cazurra,  2012).  However,  its  use  is  increasing  in
Strategic  Management  in  broader  terms  and  some  authors
suggest  that  it  should  be  understood  as  a  complementary
perspective  to  the  industry-  and  resource-based  views  (Peng
et  al.,  2009).  This  new  paradigm  is  extremely  young  in  the
Strategic  Management  discipline  and  one  of  its  challenges
in  the  next  few  years  is  to  demonstrate  the  importance  of
institutional  factors  for  our  understanding  of  competitive
advantage.
It  has  been  argued  that,  before  its  consolidation,  the
institution-based  view  needs  to  develop  stronger  measures
of  institutions  (Peng  et  al.,  2009).  A  ﬁrst  step  in  this  direc-
tion  would  be  to  take  stock  of  the  available  measures,
analyzing  their  features  and  the  interrelationships  arising
between  them.  Our  objective  in  this  paper  is  precisely  this:
to  provide  a  guide  that  will  help  researchers  to  incorporate
the  institutional  dimension  of  strategy  into  their  empiri-
cal  works  by  characterizing  the  different  measures  used
in  the  literature.  We  ﬁrst  introduce  the  institution-based
view  of  strategy  and  depict  some  of  the  areas  in  which  the
theory  is  more  promising.  Second,  we  focus  on  the  practi-
calities  of  the  application  of  this  framework  for  the  analysis
of  research  questions  in  the  Strategic  Management  arena.
More  precisely,  we  attempt  to  shed  some  light  on  the  dif-
ferent  alternatives  available  to  scholars  when  incorporating
the  role  of  institutions  into  their  empirical  work.  Although
our  intention  is  not  to  deal  with  all  the  measures  that  could
be  used  to  introduce  the  institution-based  view  of  strategy,
we  analyze  the  wide  variety  of  measurements  that  world-
wide  public  sources  offer  to  characterize  the  institutional
environment.  This  analysis  can  be  used  as  the  benchmark
against  which  new  measures  of  institutions  may  be  proposed
in  the  future.  We  follow  extant  institutional  studies  and  dis-
tinguish  between  formal  and  informal  institutions  (North,
1990),  where  the  former  are  understood  as  laws,  rules  and
regulations,  and  the  latter  as  culture,  norms  and  values.
They  are  different  but  complementary  sides  of  the  coin  that
offer  a  complete  picture  of  the  institutional  environment.
The institution-based view of the ﬁrm
Deﬁnition  and  rootsBroadly  speaking,  institutions  can  be  understood  as  the
rules  of  the  game  in  a  society  (North,  1990;  Williamson,
1998).  According  to  North  (1991),  they  are  the  humanly
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evised  constraints  that  structure  political,  economic  and
ocial  interaction.  They  impose  restrictions  by  deﬁning
egal,  moral  and  cultural  boundaries,  setting  off  legitimate
rom  illegitimate  activities  (Scott,  1995:  50).  From  a  the-
retical  point  of  view,  one  of  the  major  focuses  of  the
iterature  on  institutions  has  been  on  considering  them  as
fﬁcient  solutions  to  problems  of  organization  in  a  compet-
tive  framework  (Williamson,  1975).
Although  the  early  study  of  institutions  can  be  traced
ack  to  the  last  decades  of  the  19th  century,  the  emergence
f  the  new  institutionalism  did  not  occur  until  the  1950s
Scott,  2008).  As  in  Peng  (2002),  we  use  the  term  to  refer  to
wo  independent  streams  of  research  that  consider  the  role
f  institutions  within  society.  The  ﬁrst,  economic  in  nature,
as  its  roots  in  the  works  of  Coase  (1937)  and  Williamson
1994,  1998). These  authors  considered  formal  and  infor-
al  institutions  as  ‘‘background  conditions’’  and  focused  on
he  determinants  of  choosing  between  different  governance
tructures  (e.g.  markets  vs.  ﬁrms)  to  reduce  transaction
osts.  By  contrast,  North  (1990)  mainly  focused  on  formal
nd  informal  institutions  as  direct  determinants  of  trans-
ction  costs  in  an  economy.  The  evolutionary  economics
pproach  complements  the  static  viewpoint  of  transaction
ost  economics  by  suggesting  that  ﬁrms  continuously  adapt
heir  routines  to  the  institutional  framework  through  ‘‘an
ndogenous,  experience-based  learning  process’’  (Knudsen,
995: 203).1
Whereas  the  ﬁrst  stream  of  research  has  economic  foun-
ations  and  focuses  on  efﬁciency,  the  second  viewpoint  is
ociological  in  nature,  focuses  on  the  role  of  legitimacy
Peng,  2002) and  its  main  interest  is  to  understand  the  role
f  institutions  in  explaining  why  organizations  are  similar.
nder  this  perspective,  the  concept  of  isomorphism  is  based
n  the  need  to  conform  to  what  certain  resource  providers
hat  are  vital  for  organizational  survival  deem  appropri-
te  (Hambrick  et  al.,  2005).  Following  DiMaggio  and  Powell
1983),  pressure  from  societal  institutions  and  collective
ationality  among  organizations  are  the  key  elements  to
nderstand  homogeneity.  In  other  words,  from  this  perspec-
ive,  institutional  support  depends  on  a  ‘‘general  perception
f  organizational  actions  as  desirable,  proper  or  appropriate
ithin  some  socially  constructed  system  of  norms,  values,
eliefs  and  deﬁnitions’’  (Suchman,  1995: 576).2nd Powell have acted ‘‘in reverse’’, increasing the tendency of
rms to become more heterogeneous. Given the attention paid to
eterogeneity by Strategic Management research, the implications
f all this may be far reaching.
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of  topics  of  traditional  interest  for  strategy  researchers
can  be  easily  depicted.  For  example,  the  consideration
of  the  institution-based  view  of  strategy  in  the  context
3 In order to build Table 1, we searched for the terms ‘‘institution
and strategy’’ and ‘‘institution based view’’ in all the Journals
appearing in the ﬁrst quartile of the Social Science Citation Index
(2012). We  conducted the searches in Scopus and limited our obser-4  
s  the  result  of  the  dynamic  interaction  between  organiza-
ions  and  the  formal  and  informal  institutional  environment
Peng,  2002).
he  institution-based  view  of  strategy
he  ﬁeld  of  Strategic  Management  has  evolved  a  great  deal
ince  its  inception.  During  the  1960s,  the  discipline  paid
ttention  to  studies  that  focused  on  the  importance  of  man-
gerial  skills  (Andrews,  1971;  Ansoff,  1965;  Chandler,  1962).
he  1980s  were  characterized  by  the  role  that  industry
tructure  played  in  determining  differences  in  performance
etween  ﬁrms,  while  the  1990s  saw  the  birth  of  a  new  domi-
ant  paradigm,  the  resource-based  view  of  the  ﬁrm  (Barney,
991;  Peteraf,  1993;  Wernerfelt,  1984).  The  21st  century  has
escued  the  environment  as  a  key  determinant  in  the  analy-
is  of  ﬁrm  behavior  and  performance.  However,  this  analysis
oes  not  only  focus  on  the  industry-speciﬁc  environment,  as
appened  in  the  1980s,  but  also  highlights  the  institutional
nvironment.  As  a  consequence,  recently  a  third  leading
erspective  has  emerged  in  strategic  management.  This  per-
pective  has  been  named  the  institution-based  view  (Peng
t  al.,  2009).
One  of  the  reasons  that  could  explain  the  recent  inter-
st  in  this  new  paradigm  is  the  globalization  process  that
as  affected  most  industries  in  the  last  years  (Dunning  and
undan,  2008).  This  has  also  motivated  an  increase  in  aca-
emic  research  attempting  to  understand  the  origins  of
ompetitive  advantage  in  international  contexts.  Although
ariations  in  the  two  components  of  the  institutional  envi-
onment,  formal  and  informal,  could  be  important  within
ational  contexts,  it  seems  clear  that  its  elements  should
resent  the  highest  differences  when  different  countries  are
aken  into  account.
It  is  important  to  stress  the  intrinsic  potential  of  this
ramework  in  order  to  answer  relevant  questions  for  busi-
ess  strategy.  Previous  literature  has  used  some  institutional
imensions  before,  but  the  link  with  what  is  called  the
nstitution-based  view  of  strategy  has  only  been  implicit.
evertheless,  the  use  of  the  institution-based  view  of  strat-
gy,  as  an  integrated  framework  for  the  understanding  of
ompetitive  advantage,  is  more  recent.  In  practical  terms,
his  means  that  the  variety  of  topics  to  which  it  has  been
pplied  and  the  depth  of  the  analyses  performed  are  still
imited  and  call  for  further  research.  Following  Bamberger
2008),  the  potential  for  contributions  in  this  area  should
ot  just  consist  of  the  incorporation  of  control  variables  that
elp  to  provide  an  ad  hoc  understanding  of  some  prevailing
esults  in  the  literature,  but  should  be  an  ex  ante  exercise  in
hich  the  institutional  framework  is  incorporated  into  the
heories  of  strategic  management.
The  opportunity  for  this  framework  to  interact  with
xtant  business  strategy  research  can  be  assessed  by  consid-
ring  the  questions  that  have  been  deemed  as  important
rom  the  institution-based  view  (Peng  et  al.,  2009),  namely,
1)  how  do  ﬁrms  behave?  (2)  why  are  ﬁrms  different?  (3)
hat  determines  the  scope  of  the  ﬁrm?,  and  (4)  what  deter-
ines  the  success  or  failure  of  the  ﬁrm  in  international
ompetition?  (Rumelt  et  al.,  1994:  2).  A  ﬁrst  step  in  the
earch  for  the  corresponding  answers  from  the  institution-
ased  view  has  already  started.  Recent  papers,  since  the
v
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eminal  work  of  Peng  (2002), have  tried  to  analyze  how  insti-
utions  condition  strategic  choices  (e.g.  FDI  location  and
ntry  mode,  innovation  adoption,  executive  compensation
nd  entrepreneurship)  as  well  as  performance  (e.g.  from
amily  and  multinational  ﬁrms).  Table  1  shows  several  exam-
les  of  the  research  questions  that  previous  papers  have
ackled  taking  the  institution-based  view  as  a  theoretical
ramework  and  some  of  their  main  ﬁndings.3 Some  of  these
uestions  are  clearly  related  to  the  four  broad  areas  delin-
ated  by  Rumelt  et  al.  (1994).  For  example,  institutions  have
een  related  to  the  behavior  of  ﬁrms  by  considering  how
hey  determine  entry  mode  choices,  how  they  affect  prod-
ct  diversiﬁcation  decisions  or  how  they  condition  foreign
irect  investment  locations.  In  the  case  of  the  latter,  for
nstance,  it  has  been  found  that,  in  contexts  of  low  develop-
ent  of  formal  institutions,  ﬁrms  tend  to  prefer  acquisitions
nd  greenﬁeld  entries,  rather  than  joint  ventures  (for  more
etails,  see  Table  1).
Two  main  conclusions  arise  from  the  review  of  the  liter-
ture  that  considers  the  role  of  institutions  in  the  context
f  strategy.  The  ﬁrst  is  that  the  theory  suggests  that  the
nstitution-based  view  of  strategy  could  have  a  central
ole  in  the  development  of  strategy  research.  For  exam-
le,  recent  research  equates  the  so-called  inﬂuence  rents
ith  the  four  types  of  rents  (monopolistic,  efﬁciency,  quasi-
ents  and  Schumpeterian)  on  which  research  on  strategic
anagement  articulates  our  comprehension  of  competitive
dvantage  (Ahuja  and  Yayavaram,  2011).  Inﬂuence  rents  are
he  ‘‘extra  proﬁts  earned  by  an  economic  actor  because
he  rules  of  the  game  of  business  are  designed  or  changed
o  suit  an  economic  actor  or  a  group  of  economic  actors’’
Ahuja  and  Yayavaram,  2011: 1631).  Therefore,  they  are
he  result  of  considering  business  strategy  in  the  con-
ext  of  institutions  from  which  economic  rents  may  be
xtracted.  This  perspective  on  institutions  seems  to  call  for
n  even  more  central  role  of  their  interaction  with  busi-
ess  strategy,  and  it  also  suggests  new  relevant  directions  for
esearch.  Two  examples  of  these  questions  are  the  follow-
ng  (Ahuja  and  Yayavaram,  2011).  First,  whether  inﬂuence
ents  may  provide  ﬁrms  implementing  them  with  a  sustain-
ble  improvement  in  performance,  given  the  persistence  of
any  institutions.  Second,  whether  inﬂuence  rents  interact
ith  the  other  four  types  of  rents  to  provide  the  ﬁrm  with
ompetitive  advantage.
Furthermore,  our  review  also  shows  the  variety  of  topics
n  which  the  institution-based  view  may  be  applied  and
he  gap  that  exists  between  theory  and  empirics.  Although
t  is  not  our  objective  to  be  exhaustive,  some  exam-
les  in  which  the  theory  could  be  applied  to  the  analysisation window to papers appearing after the publication of Peng
2002). The ﬁnal selection of papers included in Table 1 attempts
o be representative of the research areas in which the institution-
ased view of strategy has been used.
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Table  1  Examples  of  existing  research  questions  and  ﬁndings  from  the  IBV.
Research  questions  References  Main  ﬁndings
How  do  institutions  determine
entry  mode  choice
(greenﬁeld  vs.  joint  ventures
vs.  acquisitions)?
Estrin  et  al.  (2009);  Meyer
et  al.  (2009);  Santangelo  and
Meyer  (2011)
In  contexts  of  a  lower  development  of  formal
institutions,  the  greenﬁeld  and  acquisition  are  preferred
to the  joint  venture  (JV)  entry  mode.  The  preference
for greenﬁeld  vs.  cooperative  entry  modes  increases
with the  distance  between  home  and  host  countries  in
formal institutions.  The  preference  for  greenﬁeld  vs.
cooperative  entry  modes  has  an  inverted  U-shaped
relationship  with  the  distance  between  home  and  host
countries  in  informal  institutions.
How do  institutions  affect
product  diversiﬁcation?
Peng  and  Delios  (2006);  Wan
(2005);  Wan  and  Hoskisson
(2003)
In  contexts  with  weaker  formal  institutions,  product
diversiﬁcation  helps  ﬁrms  to  internally  create
production  factors  whose  acquisition  in  the  market  is
subject  to  high  transaction  costs.
How do  host  market
institutions  determine  FDI
location?
Flores  and  Aguilera  (2007);
Quer  et  al.  (2012);  Kang  and
Jiang  (2012)
Institutional  factors  better  explain  FDI  location  choice
than economic  factors.  Multinationals  prefer  to  enter  in
countries  with  lower  institutional  distance  from  their
home  countries.  The  presence  of  companies  from  the
same home  country  overseas  reduces  the  perceived
institutional  distance  and  favors  multinational  entry.
How do  institutions  inﬂuence
subsidiary  performance  of
MNEs?
Chan  et  al.  (2008);
Cuervo-Cazurra  and  Genc
(2011);  Ma  et  al.  (2013);  Chan
et al.  (2010)
Institutional  development  has  a  negative  relationship
with  subsidiary  performance.  In  contexts  of  lower
institutional  development,  MNEs  from  developing
countries  have  higher  advantages  than  MNEs  from
developed  countries.  Subnational  institutions  also  affect
subsidiary  performance.
How do  institutions  improve
advantages  from  innovation?
Galang  (2012);  Zhu  et  al.
(2012);  Ahn  and  York  (2011);
Schneider  et  al.  (2010)
Technological  development  and  innovation  advantages
are favored  by  a  higher  efﬁciency  of  government
institutions  and  strong  legal,  educational  and  ﬁnancial
institutions,  which  reduce  barriers  to  innovation.
How do  institutions  improve
entrepreneurship  rates?
Lee  et  al.  (2011);  Stephan  and
Uhlander  (2010);  Peng  et  al.
(2010)
Institutional  contexts  with  a  higher  human  orientation
and assertiveness  (informal  institutions)  and  with
entrepreneur-friendly  bankruptcy  laws  (formal
institutions)  favor  entrepreneurship.
How do  institutions  increase
the  effectiveness  of
executive  compensation  on
performance?
Van  Essen  et  al.  (2012)  The  positive  effect  of  executive  compensation  on  ﬁrm
performance  is  higher  when  there  are  informal  codes  of
good corporate  governance  as  well  as  higher  rule  of  law
and investor  protection.
How do  institutions  affect
drivers  of  performance  of
family  business?
Peng  and  Jiang  (2010);  Jiang
and  Peng  (2011)
In  contexts  of  a  lower  protection  of  minority  shareholder
rights,  the  presence  of  a  family  CEO  positively
inﬂuences  ﬁrm  performance,  whereas  the  presence  of  a
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tof  ﬁrst-mover  advantages  could  lead  to  an  improved  under-
standing  of  the  advantages  accruing  to  pioneers  in  an
international  context.  This  study  could  help  to  conciliate
some  of  the  conﬂicting  evidence  on  the  topic  by  incorporat-
ing  the  macro-contextual  factors  determining  performance
to  which  we  referred  above.  Another  opportunity  arises
in  multimarket  competition  theory.  It  is  highly  likely  that
the  variation  in  the  institutional  characteristics  of  countries
could  affect  the  coordination  capabilities  of  ﬁrms  and,
hence,  the  opportunities  for  mutual  forbearance.  For  exam-
ple,  the  different  regulatory  conditions  prevailing  in  the
different  countries  forming  the  market  domains  of  ﬁrms
or  the  cultural  distances  between  these  countries  could
affect  the  ability  of  multinationals  to  coordinate  their
i
1
tpyramidal  structure  has  a  negative  inﬂuence.
nternational  operations  and  their  ability  to  collude  with
ther  multimarket  ﬁrms  (see,  for  example,  Yu  et  al.,  2009).
A  second  conclusion  from  our  review  is  that  the  majority
f  papers  focus  on  non-developed  and  emerging  countries
China,  India  and  Malaysia  are  three  examples).  This  is
nsatisfactory  because,  in  this  way,  research  on  institutions
enounces  the  exploration  of  a  part  of  the  variation  of  the
nderlying  dimensions  of  institutions.  The  decomposition  of
he  institutional  environment,  together  with  the  combina-
ion  of  a  larger  set  of  different  countries,  could  help  in
he  task  of  effectively  integrating  the  institution-based  view
nto  business  strategy  research.  Ahuja  and  Yayavaram  (2011:
646)  stress  the  possibility  that  (1)  different  sets  of  institu-
ions  may  ‘‘be  strong  and  well  developed  in  a  nation  relative
8 E.  Garrido  et  al.
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Table  2  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  (EFI).
Organization  The  Heritage  Foundation
Source  http://www.heritage.org/index/
Researchers  Ambassador  Terry  Miller  and  Anthony
B. Kim
Time  availability  1995--2012  (with  gaps)
Geographic  scope  184  countries  (2012)
Dimensions  10
Overall  Index  Yes
Scale  0  (minimum  freedom)  to  100
(maximum  freedom)
Countries with higher EFI: Hong Kong (89.9), Singapore (87.5)
f
a
t
T
I
t
d
p
W
c
T
T
d
e
f
u
i
M
s
i
t
i
d
o
l
w
e
e
c
d
e
t
e
l
b
u6  
o  other  types  of  institutions  in  that  nation’’  and  (2)  the
evel  of  development  of  a  given  set  of  institutions  may  vary
cross  different  nations.  Therefore,  opportunities  arise  for
he  exploitation  of  the  sources  of  variation  within  and  across
ifferent  institutional  contexts.  Perhaps  the  most  evident
ource  of  variation  is  the  one  that  arises  when  consider-
ng  the  different  countries  in  which  ﬁrm  strategies  could
e  implemented.  In  this  context,  the  comparison  between
eveloped,  non-developed  and  emerging  countries  seems  to
e  a  fruitful  avenue  for  research.
easuring institutions
ypes  of  institutions
s  mentioned  above,  our  main  objective  in  this  paper  is  to
rovide  a  guide  for  measuring  institutions  by  taking  stock
f  the  available  measures.  A  ﬁrst  step  in  this  direction  is  to
istinguish  between  the  different  types  of  institutions  that
an  be  identiﬁed.  We  closely  follow  the  widely  accepted
lassiﬁcation  of  North  (1990),  which  distinguishes  between
ormal  and  informal  institutions.
Formal  institutions  refer  to  explicit  rules  in  a  society
uch  as  laws,  regulations,  property  rights  protection  or  dis-
ipline  of  economic  and  political  markets  and  contracts
Dunning  and  Lundan,  2008;  Meyer  et  al.,  2009).  They  have
o  be  explicitly  established  by  an  authority  or  an  organiza-
ion/individual.  They  are  susceptible  to  change  over  time
nd  can  anticipate  the  desirable  behavior  of  individuals
nd  organizations  from  general  and  simple  exchanges  (e.g.
hrough  laws)  to  speciﬁc  and  complex  ones  (e.g.  by  a  con-
ract  or  a  judicial  resolution).
Informal  institutions  can  be  understood  as  those  con-
traints  that  people  in  a  society  impose  upon  themselves  to
ive  a  structure  to  their  relations  with  others  (North,  1990).
hese  rules  are  transmitted  from  one  generation  to  another
y  teaching  and  imitation  (Boyd  and  Richerson,  1995) and,
ccording  to  North  (1990:  37),  are  a  part  of  the  heritage
hat  we  call  culture.  Tradition,  religion,  language,  customs,
alues  and  trust-based  relationships  are  some  examples  of
nformal  institutions  (Dunning  and  Lundan,  2008).  Unlike  for-
al  institutions,  informal  institutions  have  their  source  in
he  values  of  a  society  and  are  difﬁcult  to  change  over  time
North,  1990).
One  of  the  main  challenges  for  researchers  attempting
o  integrate  extant  research  on  business  strategy  and  the
nstitution-based  view  of  the  ﬁrm  is  to  obtain  information
n  these  two  dimensions.  In  order  to  select  the  measures  to
nalyze,  we  have  imposed  three  criteria:  (1)  they  have  to  be
requently  used  in  the  (Strategic)  Management  literature,
2)  they  also  have  to  be  publicly  available  for  researchers
nd  (3)  they  must  have  been  speciﬁcally  designed  to  capture
he  institutional  characteristics  of  markets.  In  presenting
he  different  alternatives,  we  offer  a  description  of  each
ndex,  its  dimensions,  time  horizon  and  geographic  scope,
nd  we  offer  examples  of  papers  that  have  incorporated
hese  measures  into  their  analyses.  Additionally,  wherever
ossible,  correlation  and  factorial  analyses  are  used  for
oth  formal  and  informal  institutional  indicators  in  order
o  determine  the  extent  to  which  they  converge  or  differ.
e  ﬁrst  analyze  four  measures  that  may  be  used  to  measure
a
a
o
pand Australia (83.1).
Countries with lower EFI: Cuba (28.3), Zimbabwe (26.3) and
North Korea (1.00).
ormal  institutions  and  then  move  on  to  consider  Hofstede’s
nd  the  GLOBE  studies  as  tools  to  capture  informal  institu-
ions.
he  measurement  of  formal  institutions
n  this  section,  we  focus  on  four  different  approximations  to
he  measurement  of  formal  institutions:  the  economic  free-
om  index, the  political  constraints  index, the  corruption
erceptions  index  and  the  worldwide  governance  indicators.
e  ﬁrst  brieﬂy  present  their  main  characteristics  and  then
ompare  them.
he  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  (EFI)
he  Index  of  Economic  Freedom  (see  Table  2  for  more
etails),  offered  by  the  Heritage  Foundation,  measures  the
xtent  of  government  support  to  a person’s  control  of  the
ruits  of  his/her  labor  and  initiative.  This  index  has  been
sed  in  previous  research  as  a  measure  of  the  level  of
nstitutional  development  of  a  country  (Gubbi  et  al.,  2010;
eyer  and  Sinani,  2009) or  of  the  strength  of  market-
upporting  institutions  (Meyer  et  al.,  2009).  A  higher  score
n  this  index  has  been  linked  to  stronger  institutions,  that  is,
hose  that  support  voluntary  economic  exchanges  by  assur-
ng  transparency  and  predictability.
The  overall  index  is  calculated  as  the  average  of  10
imensions  that  are  grouped  into  four  categories:  (i)  rule
f  law,  (ii)  regulatory  efﬁciency,  (iii)  open  markets  and  (iv)
imited  government.  Rule  of  law  refers  to  the  extent  to
hich  the  state  protects  private  property  rights  from  unfair
xpropriation  and  theft  through  the  judicial  system  (prop-
rty  rights) and  to  which  the  market  is  free  from  political
orruption  through  transparency  in  the  regulatory  proce-
ures  and  processes  (freedom  from  corruption). Regulatory
fﬁciency  determines  whether  the  state  allows  individuals
o  establish  and  run  their  own  businesses  without  interfer-
nce  (business  freedom);  whether  it  favors  a  policy  based  on
ow  inﬂation,  price  stability  and  independence  of  the  central
ank  (monetary  freedom)  and  whether  it  allows  individ-
als  to  work  as  much  as  they  want  and  wherever  they  want
nd  businesses  to  contract  and  dismiss  workers  according  to
ctivity  requirements  (labor  freedom).  The  third  category,
pen  markets,  describes  the  degree  to  which  regulation  sup-
orts  market  exchanges  without  restrictions  in  the  national
87
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.The  institution-based  view  of  strategy:  How  to  measure  it  
and  international  ﬂow  of  goods  and  services  (trade  freedom)
and  capital  (investment  freedom).  It  also  considers  whether
it  encourages  transparency,  integrity  and  efﬁciency  in  the
access  to  ﬁnancing  (ﬁnancial  freedom).  Finally,  limited  gov-
ernment  determines  the  level  of  lack  of  taxation  (ﬁscal
freedom)  and  spending  (government  spending)  in  a  coun-
try.  It  is  considered  that  high  levels  of  government  spending
are  associated  with  high  levels  of  taxation,  which  reduces
individuals’  resources.  For  this  reason,  a  high  score  in  these
two  dimensions  --  lower  levels  of  public  taxation  and  spend-
ing  --  is  considered  a  signal  of  greater  freedom  of  individuals
in  a  society,  since  they  can  freely  decide  the  destination  of
their  resources.
The  Heritage  Foundation  offers  an  annual  ranking  of
countries  according  to  the  overall  EFI  index.  In  addition,  the
Heritage  Foundation  classiﬁes  the  listed  countries  accord-
ing  to  ﬁve  categories:  free  (100--80),  mostly  free  (79.9--70),
moderately  free  (69.9--60),  mostly  unfree  (59.9--50)  and
repressed  (49.9--0).
Table  3  provides  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  over-
all  index  and  for  the  ten  dimensions  it  consists  of  (from
1995  to  2012).  As  it  can  be  observed,  the  average  score  is
higher  for  dimensions  such  as  ﬁscal  and  monetary  freedom
(71  over  100),  whereas  the  lowest  average  scores  refer  to
property  rights  protection  and  freedom  from  corruption  (48
and  40  over  100,  respectively).  Almost  all  the  EFI  dimensions
present  signiﬁcant  correlations  within  them.  The  correla-
tions  are  especially  high  for  the  pairs  (1)  property  rights
and  freedom  from  corruption  (r  =  0.83),  (2)  business  freedom
and  property  rights  protection  (r  =  0.75)  and  (3)  investment
and  ﬁnancial  freedom  (r  =  0.72).  Interestingly,  all  the  cor-
relations  are  positive  with  the  only  exception  of  the  ones
involving  ﬁscal  freedom  and  government  spending  (limited
government  category),  which  present  some  negative  corre-
lations  with  the  other  EFI  dimensions.
Given  the  high  correlations  between  some  EFI  dimen-
sions,  we  have  considered  it  interesting  to  carry  out  a  factor
and  a  cluster  analysis  with  the  aim  of  determining  the  extent
to  which  the  dimensions  differ.  Both  techniques  show  similar
results  for  all  the  years  for  which  the  information  is  avail-
able.  Therefore,  we  base  our  comments  on  the  most  recent
year  (2012).4 Using  a  principal  component  factor  analy-
sis  with  varimax  rotation,  two  signiﬁcant  factors  emerge
(Table  4).  All  the  dimensions  have  signiﬁcant  factor  load-
ings  (i.e.  ≥±  0.40)  on  only  one  of  the  two  factors.  The  ﬁrst
factor  includes  three  categories,  i.e.  rule  of  law  (property
rights  and  freedom  from  corruption),  regulatory  efﬁciency
(business,  monetary  and  labor  freedom)  and  open  markets
(trade,  investment  and  ﬁnancial  freedom).  The  second  fac-
tor  includes  the  limited  government  category  (ﬁscal  freedom
and  government  spending).  After  carrying  out  a  cluster  anal-
ysis  using  the  ten  dimensions,  the  countries  are  divided  into
two  groups,  in  accordance  with  the  Calinski-Harabasz  test.
When  the  average  factor  scores  are  calculated  for  the  two
groups,  it  is  observed  that  countries  in  Group  1  are  charac-
terized  by  a  higher  score  in  Factor  1  (rule  of  law,  regulatory
efﬁciency  and  open  markets  categories)  and  a  lower  score
in  Factor  2  (limited  government)  than  countries  in  Group  2.
4 The analysis for the rest of the periods is consistent with the one
presented here (it is available from the authors upon request).
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Table  4  EFI  categories,  scores  and  country  classiﬁcation  (2012).
Principal  component  factor  analysis
Variable  Factor  1  Factor  2
Property  rights  0.90  −0.23
Freedom from  corruption 0.86 −0.27
Fiscal  freedom −0.03 0.86
Government  spending  −0.26  0.70
Business freedom  0.82  0.08
Monetary freedom  0.65  0.38
Labor freedom  0.48  0.37
Trade freedom  0.71  0.23
Investment freedom  0.86  0.00
Financial freedom  0.86  0.05
Cluster analysis
Group  Average  factor  score  Countries
Group  1
Higher  av.  score  factor
1 =  1.10
•  Rule  of  law  (property
rights  and  freedom  from
corruption);
•  Regulatory  efﬁciency
(business,  monetary  and
labor  freedom);
•  Open  markets  (trade,
investment  and  ﬁnancial
freedom).
Armenia,  Australia,  Austria,  Bahrain,  Barbados,  Belgium,  Botswana,  Bulgaria,  Canada,
Chile, Colombia,  Cyprus,  Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Dominica,  Estonia,  Finland,  France,
Georgia, Germany,  Greece,  Hong  Kong,  Hungary,  Iceland,  Ireland,  Israel,  Italy,  Jamaica,
Japan, Jordan,  Lithuania,  Luxembourg,  Macedonia,  Malaysia,  Malta,  Mauritius,  Mexico,
Montenegro,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Oman,  Poland,  Portugal,  Santa  Lucia,  Saint  Vincent
and the  Grenadines,  Saudi  Arabia,  Singapore,  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Spain,  Sweden,
Switzerland,  The  Netherlands,  Trinidad  y  Tobago,  United  Kingdom,  United  States.
Lower av.  score  factor
2 =  −0.32
•  Limited  government
(ﬁscal  freedom  and
government  spending)
Group  2
Lower  av.  score  factor
1 =  −0.51
•  Rule  of  law  (property
rights  and  freedom  from
corruption);
•  Regulatory  efﬁciency
(business,  monetary  and
labor  freedom);
•  Open  markets  (trade,
investment  and  ﬁnancial
freedom).
Albania,  Algeria,  Angola,  Argentina,  Azerbaijan,  Bangladesh,  Belarus,  Belize,  Benin,
Bhutan,  Bolivia,  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  Brazil,  Burkina  Faso,  Burma,  Burundi,  Ivory
Coast, Cambodia,  Cameroon,  Cape  Verde,  Central  African  Republic,  Chad,  China,
Comoros,  Costa  Rica,  Croatia,  Cuba,  DR  Congo,  Djibouti,  Dominican  Republic,  Ecuador,
Egypt, El  Salvador,  Equatorial  Guinea,  Eritrea,  Ethiopia,  Fiji,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Guatemala,
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,  Guyana,  Haiti,  Honduras,  India,  Indonesia,  Iran,  Kazakhstan,
Kenya, Kiribati,  Kuwait,  Kyrgyz  Republic,  Laos,  Latvia,  Lebanon,  Lesotho,  Liberia,
Libya, Macau,  Madagascar,  Malawi,  Mauritania,  Micronesia,  Moldova,  Mongolia,
Morocco,  Mozambique,  Namibia,  Nepal,  Nicaragua,  Niger,  Nigeria,  North  Korea,
Pakistan,  Panama,  Papua  New  Guinea,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Qatar,  R.  Congo,  Romania,
Russia, Rwanda,  Santo  Tomé  y  Príncipe,  Samoa,  Senegal,  Serbia,  Seychelles,  Sierra
Leone, Solomon  I.,  South  Africa,  Sri  Lanka,  Suriname,  Swaziland,  Syria,  Taiwan,
Tajikistan,  Tanzania,  Thailand,  The  Bahamas,  The  Gambia,  The  Philippines,
Timor-Leste,  Togo,  Tonga,  Tunisia,  Turkey,  Turkmenistan,  Uganda,  Ukraine,  United  Arab
Emirates,  Uzbekistan,  Vanuatu,  Venezuela,  Vietnam
Higher av.  score  factor
2 =  0.15
•  Limited  government
(ﬁscal  freedom  and
m
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egovernment  spending).
This  index  has  frequently  been  used  to  measure  for-
al  institutions.  Although  there  are  examples  in  which  the
0  dimensions  have  been  employed  at  the  same  time,  in
ther  papers,  only  some  of  the  dimensions  of  Factor  1
re  introduced  into  the  empirical  analyses.  For  instance,
eyer  and  Sinani  (2009)  use  the  average  score  for  the
usiness  freedom,  trade  freedom,  investment  freedom,
i
M
bnancial  freedom  and  property  rights  dimensions  to  ana-
yze  variations  in  spillovers  from  foreign  direct  investment
FDI)  in  developing  and  developed  countries  and  transition
conomies.  Similarly,  Meyer  et  al.  (2009)  focus  on  emerg-
ng  economies  to  analyze  entry  mode  strategies  followed  by
NEs  depending  on  the  level  of  institutional  development
ased  on  the  ﬁve  dimensions  previously  mentioned.
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Table  5  Political  Constraint  Index  (POLCON).
Source  http://www-management.wharton.
upenn.edu/henisz/
Researcher  Witold  Henisz
Time  availability  1960--2007  (with  gaps)
Geographic  scope  192  countries  (2007)
Dimensions  No
Overall  Index  Yes  (2)
Scale  0  (high  level  of  political  hazards)  to  1
(low level  of  political  hazards)
Countries with higher POLCON: Morocco (0.73) and Belgium
(0.69).
Countries with lower POLCON: Cuba (0.00), Iran (0.00) and
Table  7  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  (CPI).
Organization  Transparency  International
Source  http://www.transparency.org/
research/cpi/overview
Researcher  Johann  Graf  Lambsdorff
Time  availability  1995--2011  (with  gaps)
Geographic  scope  183  countries
Dimensions  No
Overall  Index Yes
Scale  0  (high  level  of  corruption)  to  10  (low
level  of  corruption)
Countries with the highest level of corruption: North Korea (1.0)
and Somalia (1.0).
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in  order  to  develop  year-to-year  comparisons  (Lambsdorff,Somalia (0.00).
Political  Constraints  Index  (POLCON)
The  Political  Constraints  Index  (see  Table  5  for  more  details)
measures  the  extent  to  which  policy  changes  are  constrained
by  institutional  and  political  factors  (Henisz,  2000).  It  is
assumed  that  a  higher  number  of  constraints  is  positive,
given  that  it  promotes  stability,  reducing  political  hazards
and,  thus,  uncertainty.  For  this  reason,  this  index  has  been
used  to  measure  the  variable  political  stability  (Guler  and
Guillén,  2009;  Vaaler  and  Schrage,  2009).
The  POLCON  database  offers  two  measures  of  politi-
cal  constraints.  The  ﬁrst,  POLCON,  identiﬁes  the  degree  of
constraints  on  policy  change  using  data  on  the  number  of
independent  veto  points  in  the  political  system  (executive,
legislative,  judicial  and  sub-federal  branches  of  govern-
ment)  and  the  distribution  of  political  preferences  both
across  and  within  these  branches  (Henisz,  2000:  4).  There
is  an  alternative  measure,  POLCONJ,  which  also  takes  into
account  the  alignment  between  the  judicial  and  executive
powers  as  well  as  the  polarization  or  fractionalization  of  the
courts.  A  high  score  in  this  index  means  that  political  hazards
are  low  and,  thus,  ﬁrms  are  in  a  better  position  to  anticipate
market  conditions.
As can  be  observed  in  Table  6,  the  average  POLCON  index
has  increased  from  1960  to  2007,  which  means  that,  on  aver-
age,  the  political  hazard  has  decreased  over  time.  There  is
also  a  high  variability  among  countries:  some  of  them  score
0  (minimum),  whereas  the  maximum  score  is  0.89.  It  can  be
highlighted  that  POLCONJ  is  very  stable  over  time.
When  management  researchers  use  this  indicator,  they
mainly  focus  on  POLCON  instead  of  POLCONJ,  perhaps
2
o
c
Table  6  Descriptive  Statistics  POLCON  (1960--2007).a
Index  Period  Obs.  Mean  
POLCON  1960--1980  2816  0.22  
POLCON 1981--2000  3195  0.33  
POLCON 2001--2007  1167  0.42  
POLCON 1960--2007  7178  0.30  
POLCONJ 1960--1980  2495  0.12  
POLCONJ 1981--2001  2327  0.13  
POLCONJ 1960--2001  4822  0.12  
a Correlation between POLCON and POLCONJ is 0.79 (p < 0.01).Countries with the lowest level of corruption: New Zealand (9.5),
Denmark (9.4) and Finland (9.4).
ecause  the  two  are  highly  correlated  (0.79)  and  POLCON
as  a  notably  higher  number  of  observations.  Previous  stud-
es  have  observed  that  the  political  stability  of  a country
llows  a  higher  rate  of  entry  into  a  foreign  market  by  Amer-
can  venture  capital  ﬁrms  (Guler  and  Guillén,  2009).  Political
tability  also  moderates  the  relationship  between  the  resid-
al  state  ownership  of  a  privatized  ﬁrm  and  the  ﬁnancial
erformance  associated  with  strategic  decisions  of  privatiz-
ng  ﬁrms,  and  between  the  time  since  privatization  and  this
erformance  (Vaaler  and  Schrage,  2009).
orruption  Perceptions  Index  (CPI)
he  Corruption  Perceptions  Index  (see  Table  7  for  more
etails)  measures  the  extent  to  which  international  busi-
essmen  and  ﬁnancial  journalist  perceive  corruption  in  the
ublic  sector  of  a given  country.  It  includes  perceptions
bout  the  bribery  of  public  ofﬁcials,  kickbacks  in  pub-
ic  procurement,  and  the  effectiveness  of  public  sector
nti-corruption  efforts.  It  considers  corruption  in  a  strict
ense,  without  other  dimensions  such  as  political  instabil-
ty,  and  it  has  been  understood  as  the  most  comprehensive
uantitative  indicator  of  cross-country  corruption  available
DiRienzo  et  al.,  2007).
The  Transparency  International  Society  also  offers  a  rank-
ng  of  countries.  However,  it  is  important  to  consider  the
cores  of  each  country  instead  of  its  position  in  the  ranking007) because  this  position  not  only  depends  on  the  scores
f  each  country,  but  also  on  the  number  of  participant
ountries  in  each  edition.  Since  this  number  has  varied  over
S.D.  Min  Max
0.31  0  0.89
0.34  0  0.89
0.32  0  0.89
0.33  0  0.89
0.22  0  0.86
0.22  0  0.85
0.22  0  0.86
90  
Table  8  Descriptive  Statistics  CPI  (1995--2011).
Period  Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max
1995--2000  420  5.05  2.48  0.69  10
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t2001--2011 1665  4.13  2.19  0.40  9.9
1995--2011 2085  4.32  2.28  0.4  10
ime,  a  country  could  occupy  different  positions  in  the  rank-
ng  in  two  consecutive  years  although  its  score  --  and,  thus,
ts  perceived  corruption  -- had  not  changed.
Table  8  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  for  the  CPI  from
995  to  2011.  As  can  be  observed,  the  average  corruption
ndex  has  decreased  from  the  ﬁrst  period  1995--2000  to  the
econd  2001--2011,  meaning  that,  on  average,  the  level  of
orruption  in  the  public  sector  has  increased.  This  decrease
f  the  index  is  caused  by  the  inclusion  in  this  study  of  new
ountries  with  low  scores  (high  level  of  corruption)  in  the  CPI
n  the  ﬁrst  decade  of  the  21st  century.  While  the  number  of
articipant  countries  in  2000  was  91,  it  increased  to  182  in
011.
Unlike  EFI  and  POLCON,  the  CPI  is  based  on  only  one
imension/indicator.  Previous  studies  have  used  it  to  ana-
yze  how  the  level  of  corruption  of  a  country  inﬂuences
rm  decisions.  For  instance,  Habib  and  Zurawicki  (2002)  and
ajunen  (2008)  analyze  developed  and  developing  countries
nd  ﬁnd  a  negative  impact  of  the  CPI  on  the  level  of  FDI
n  a  country.  Spencer  and  Gomez  (2011),  analysing  Eastern
uropean  countries  and  Ghana,  found  a  positive  relationship
etween  the  host  country  corruption  environment  and  the
ressure  that  subsidiaries  face  to  engage  in  bribery  locally.
ther  studies  have  analyzed  how  the  access  to  information
nd  technology  in  a  given  country  is  negatively  related  to
he  level  of  corruption  (DiRienzo  et  al.,  2007),  whereas  the
ore  rapid  rate  of  change  in  FDI  in  a  country  is  positively
elated  to  it  (Robertson  and  Watson,  2004).
orldwide  Governance  Indicators  (WGI)
he  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  (see  Table  9  for  more
etails)  have  been  used  in  previous  studies  to  measure  the
overnance  of  countries,  in  other  words,  the  set  of  traditions
nd  institutions  by  which  authority  in  a  country  is  exercised
nd  by  which  it  is  expected  to  affect  economic  activity
Cuervo-Cazurra  and  Genc,  2011;  Globerman  and  Shapiro,
003;  Oh  and  Oetzel,  2011).  It  includes  three  categories
f  information:  (1)  the  process  by  which  governments  are
Table  9  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  (WGI).
Organization  World  Bank  Group
Source  http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.asp
Researcher  Daniel  Kaufmann,  Aart  Kraay,
Massimo  Mastrucci
Time  availability  1996,  1998,  2000,  2002--2011
Geographic  scope  215  countries
Dimensions  6
Overall  Index  No
Scale  −2.5  (low  governance)  to  2.5  (high
governance)  (approx.)
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elected,  monitored  and  replaced;  (2)  the  capacity  of  the
overnment  to  effectively  formulate  and  implement  sound
olicies;  and  (3)  the  respect  of  citizens  and  the  State  for  the
nstitutions  that  govern  the  economic  and  social  interactions
mong  them.
There  are  six  governance  indicators  that  are  based  on  the
hree  previous  categories:  (1)  Voice  and  accountability  (VA)
etermine  the  degree  to  which  citizens  can  exert  their  free-
om  rights  and  participate  in  selecting  their  government,
hile  Political  stability  and  absence  of  violence/terrorism
PS)  measure  perceptions  about  the  likelihood  that  the
overnment  would  be  destabilized  by  unconstitutional  or
iolent  means  or  by  terrorists;  (2)  Government  effec-
iveness  (GE)  includes  perceptions  about  the  quality  of
ublic  services,  the  civil  service,  policy  formulation  and
he  implementation  and  credibility  of  public  policies,  while
egulatory  quality  (RQ)  captures  the  degree  to  which  gov-
rnments  implement  policies  and  regulations  to  promote
rivate  sector  development;  (3)  Rule  of  law  (RL)  measures
he  quality  of  contract  enforcement,  property  rights  protec-
ion  and  the  likelihood  of  crime  and  violence,  and  Control  of
orruption  (CC)  measures  the  extent  to  which  public  power
s  exercised  for  private  gain  and  the  inﬂuence  of  private
nterests  on  public  policies.  Thus,  in  a  country  with  high
cores  in  these  dimensions,  economic  agents  can  more  easily
nticipate  the  results  of  their  economic  activities,  provided
hat  there  is  a  respect  for  regulation  and  contracts,  a  lack  of
iolence  and  corruption,  and  regulatory  quality  and  effec-
iveness.
Table  10  provides  the  descriptive  statistics  of  WGI  from
996  to  2011.  As  can  be  observed,  the  average  score  is  sim-
lar  for  all  indicators  (close  to  0).  All  of  them  are  highly
orrelated,  with  values  ranging  from  0.66  to  0.93.
To  understand  the  structure  of  the  indicators,  we  have
erformed  an  exploratory  factor  analysis  using  the  princi-
al  component  method  with  varimax  rotation  for  the  most
ecent  period  in  which  information  is  available  (2011).5 In
his  case,  the  six  indicators  were  reduced  to  one  factor,  with
actor  loadings  between  0.83  and  0.98.
Despite  the  high  correlation  between  indicators,  previous
tudies  vary  in  the  way  that  they  have  used  them  in  empirical
nalyses.  For  instance,  Globerman  and  Shapiro  (2003)  take
he  common  factor  based  on  the  six  indicators  to  show  that
overnance  institutions  determine  FDI  inﬂows  and  outﬂows
n  developed  and  developing  countries.  Other  researchers
erform  the  empirical  analysis  for  each  of  the  six  indicators,
nstead  of  reducing  them  to  a  common  factor.  For  instance,
uervo-Cazurra  and  Genc  (2011)  analyze  developing  coun-
ry  MNEs  in  comparison  with  developed  country  MNEs  and
nd  that  the  indicators  related  to  regulatory  quality,  rule
f  law  and  control  of  corruption  of  the  least  developed
ountries  have  a  key  role  in  explaining  the  prevalence  of
eveloping-country  MNEs  among  the  largest  subsidiaries  of
oreign  ﬁrms  in  these  countries.  Oh  and  Oetzel  (2011)  also
nclude  each  of  the  six  indicators  to  analyze  the  moderat-
ng  role  of  governance  quality  in  the  variation  of  European
NEs’  investments  at  subsidiary  level  in  response  to  major
5 These analyses remain stable for the other periods. This infor-
ation is available from the authors upon request.
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Table  10  Descriptive  Statistics  WGI  (1996--2011).
Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6
1.VA  2683  −0.01  1.00  −2.30  1.83  --
2.PS 2640  −0.03  1.00  −3.30  1.95  0.69* --
3.GE 2632  −0.01  1.00  −2.45  2.37  0.78* 0.69* --
4.RQ 2632  −0.01  1.00  −2.67  2.22  0.80* 0.66* 0.93* --
5.RL 2661  −0.02  1.00  −2.68  2.01  0.81* 0.79* 0.93* 0.89* --
6.CC 2635  −0.01  1.00  −2.06  2.59  0.77* 0.73* 0.93* 0.87* 0.93* --
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disasters.  However,  they  ﬁnd  similar  results  for  each  of  the
six  indicators.
Comparing  the  indicators
Having  presented  the  main  measures  of  formal  institutions,
in  this  subsection,  we  offer  a  comparison  between  them.
Table  11  shows  the  correlations  between  all  the  previous
indicators6 for  the  177  countries  that  appear  in  all  the
indexes  for  the  last  available  year,  2007.7
As  can  be  observed,  there  is  a  high  correlation  between
EFI  8,  CPI  and  WGI  (0.89--0.94),  which  means  that  these
indicators  seem  to  measure  related  dimensions  of  formal
institutions.  Moreover,  the  correlation  is  especially  high
between  some  indicators  and  dimensions  that  capture  simi-
lar  institutional  aspects.  These  include  corruption  (freedom
from  corruption  from  EFI,  the  CPI  and  control  of  corruption
from  WGI  have  a  correlation  that  ranges  from  0.96  to  0.98)
and  property  rights  protection  (property  rights  from  EFI  and
rule  of  law  from  WGI  have  a  correlation  of  0.91).
By  contrast,  correlations  have  a  lower  value  between  EFI
2  and  the  other  indicators  and  dimensions,  which  seems  to
conﬁrm  that  ﬁscal  freedom  and  government  spending  cap-
ture  government  size  instead  of  regulatory  issues,  as  the
other  EFI  dimensions  do.  The  POLCON  index  also  has  a  lower
correlation  with  the  other  indicators,  which  suggests  that  it
is  measuring  a  different  dimension.
Additionally,  we  have  conducted  an  exploratory  factor
analysis  through  the  principal  component  method  for  EFI  8,
POLCON,  CPI  and  the  six  WGI  indicators  in  the  last  avail-
able  period  (2007).  Table  12  shows  that  they  are  reduced  to
one  factor  that  we  have  called  formal  institutional  develop-
ment  (FID).  We  have  calculated  the  value  of  this  variable  for
each  country.  Table  12  offers  a  summary  of  the  ten  countries
with  the  highest  and  lowest  scores  of  the  FID.  As  can  be
observed,  the  results  are  consistent  with  the  classiﬁcation
obtained  from  the  EFI  dimensions  and  that  presented  in
Table  4,  because  countries  with  the  highest  scores  of  FID
6 We have included three additional indicators. Although the Index
of Economic Freedom offers an overall index, we have shown that
the 10 dimensions converge into two factors that behave differ-
ently (we have named them EFI 8 and EFI 2). We have included
both of them in the analysis. Additionally, given that the World-
wide Governance Indicators do not provide an overall index, we
have included the common factor that was previously calculated to
allow comparisons between indicators.
7 These analyses remain stable for the other periods. Data are
available from the authors upon request.
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ﬁelong  to  Group  1  whereas  countries  with  the  lowest  score
f  FID  belong  to  Group  2.
he  measurement  of  informal  institutions
n  this  section,  we  review  the  most  widespread  alternatives
o  capture  informal  institutions:  Hofstede  and  GLOBE
Global  Leadership  and  Organizational  Behavior  Effective-
ess).  However,  we  have  to  acknowledge  that  there  are  also
ther  options  to  measure  informal  institutions.  For  instance,
chwartz’s  value  survey  (1994),  Inglehart  and  Associates’
orld  Values  Survey  (1997)  and  Trompenaars  and  Hampden-
urner  (1997)  also  allow  the  consideration  of  cultural  issues
cross  countries.  In  any  case,  due  to  their  relevance  and
iffusion  among  the  academic  community  (Hofstede,  2006;
ung  and  Verbeke,  2010;  Smith,  2006),  we  focus  our  atten-
ion  on  Hofstede  and  GLOBE.
ofstede
n  his  seminal  book  ‘‘Culture’s  Consequences:  Interna-
ional  Differences  in  Work-Related  Values’’ (1980),  Geert
ofstede  developed  several  indicators  to  capture  cross-
ational  cultural  differences.  Hofstede  initially  collected
ata  from  116,000  questionnaire-based  surveys  delivered
o  IBM  managers  participating  in  international  manage-
ent  development  courses  in  1967  and  1973.  At  ﬁrst,  the
tudy  was  conducted  for  40  countries,  but  its  coverage  was
xtended  to  cover  93  countries  in  2010  (Table  13).
The  four  initial  dimensions  were  extended  to  ﬁve  in
991  and  six  in  2010  by  Michel  Bond  and  Michel  Minkov,
espectively.  The  six  dimensions  are  the  following:  (1)  Power
istance  measures  the  extent  to  which  unequal  distributions
f  power  are  accepted  by  the  less  powerful  members  of  a
ociety;  (2)  Uncertainty  avoidance  reﬂects  societal  stress
s  well  as  intolerance  for  uncertainty  and  ambiguity;  (3)
ndividualism  vs.  collectivism  shows  the  extent  to  which
ndividuals  are  integrated  into  groups;  (4)  Masculinity  vs.
emininity  is  related  to  emotional  gender  roles  in  which  mas-
ulinity  is  associated  with  assertiveness  and  competitiveness
nd  femininity  to  modesty  and  caring;  (5)  Long  vs.  short
erm  orientation  is  related  to  society’s  search  for  virtue,
ith  short-term  orientation  being  associated  with  respect
or  traditions,  quick  results  and  lower  levels  of  savings
nd  investments,  and  long-term  orientation  with  a  better
daptation  to  changes,  long-term  results  and  higher  lev-
ls  of  savings  and  investments;  (6)  Indulgence  vs.  restraint
etermines  the  extent  to  which  a  society  allows  free  grati-
cation  such  as  having  fun  (indulgence)  or  suppresses  the
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Table  11  Correlation  Matrix  All  Indicators  (2007)**
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22
1  EFI  -
2 EFI  8  dimensions  0.96* -
3 EFI  2  dimensions  -0.17  -0.43* -
4 Property  Rights  0.85* 0.91* -0.47* -
5 Freedom  from  Corruption  0.79* 0.87* -0.54* 0.88* -
6 Fiscal  Freedom  -0.09  -0.30* 0.79* -0.33* -0.38* -
7 Government  Spending  -0.18  -0.43* 0.93* -0.46* -0.53* 0.51* -
8 Business  Freedom  0.83* 0.85* -0.34* 0.75* 0.74* -0.26* -0.32* -
9 Monetary  Freedom  0.58* 0.59* -0.19  0.47* 0.44* -0.18  -0.16  0.42* -
10 Labor  Freedom  0.56* 0.52* -0.02  0.39* 0.35* 0.03  -0.05  0.47* 0.18  -
11 Trade  Freedom  0.62* 0.65* -0.29* 0.48* 0.51* -0.13  -0.33* 0.50* 0.31* 0.20  -
12 Investment  Freedom  0.79* 0.83* -0.37* 0.71* 0.63* -0.29* -0.34* 0.65* 0.51* 0.26* 0.53* -
13 Financial  Freedom  0.77* 0.77* -0.25* 0.60* 0.53* -0.16  -0.25* 0.57* 0.48* 0.31* 0.52* 0.67* -
14 POLCON  0.57* 0.63* -0.40* 0.58* 0.53* -0.28* -0.38* 0.56* 0.34* 0.23* 0.47* 0.63* 0.46* -
15 CPI  0.79* 0.89* -0.58* 0.90* 0.98* -0.42* -0.57* 0.75* 0.48* 0.34* 0.57* 0.68* 0.55* 0.57* -
16 WGI  0.84* 0.92* -0.54* 0.91* 0.92* -0.36* -0.55* 0.77* 0.52* 0.36* 0.58* 0.74* 0.61* 0.64* 0.94* -
17 Voice  &  Accountability  0.73* 0.80* -0.50* 0.78* 0.70* -0.39* -0.47* 0.68* 0.45* 0.24* 0.53* 0.74* 0.66* 0.72* 0.74* 0.86* -
18 Political  Stability  0.54* 0.61* -0.43* 0.61* 0.68* -0.21  -0.48* 0.45* 0.36* 0.18  0.43* 0.51* 0.38* 0.40* 0.68* 0.79* 0.62* -
19 Government  Effectiveness  0.81* 0.89* -0.51* 0.89* 0.92* -0.34* -0.52* 0.79* 0.49* 0.38* 0.55* 0.68* 0.54* 0.60* 0.93* 0.95* 0.75* 0.65* -
20 Regulatory  Quality  0.90* 0.95* -0.43* 0.88* 0.87* -0.27* -0.45* 0.79* 0.58* 0.40* 0.64* 0.80* 0.70* 0.65* 0.88* 0.94* 0.80* 0.63* 0.93* -
21 Rule  of  Law  0.81* 0.89* -0.54* 0.91* 0.93* -0.35* -0.55* 0.76* 0.52* 0.37* 0.53* 0.69* 0.54* 0.60* 0.93* 0.97* 0.79* 0.76* 0.94* 0.90* -
22 Control  of  Corruption  0.78* 0.87* -0.56* 0.90* 0.96* -0.38* -0.56* 0.73* 0.47* 0.35* 0.51* 0.66* 0.53* 0.57* 0.97* 0.95* 0.75* 0.70* 0.93* 0.86* 0.94* -
** There are 177 common countries
* p<0.01; correlation > 0.70 in black.
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Table  12  Factor  analysis  (2007).
Variable FID  Uniqueness
EFI  8  0.94  0.12
POLCON  0.71  0.50
CPI 0.96  0.08
VA 0.87  0.24
PS 0.74 0.45
GE  0.96 0.08
RQ  0.96 0.08
RL  0.97 0.05
CC  0.96  0.08
Highest  FID  Lowest  FID
Country  Factor  1  Country  Factor  1
Denmark  2.19  Zimbabwe  −1.72
Finland  2.04  Turkmenistan  −1.60
New Zealand  2.01  Chad  −1.52
Switzerland  1.99  Guinea  −1.39
Sweden  1.99  Equatorial  Guinea  −1.34
Iceland  1.94  Uzbekistan  −1.33
The Netherlands  1.92  Central  African  Rep.  −1.33
Australia  1.91  Côte  d’Ivoire  −1.30
Austria 1.86  Venezuela  −1.29
Canada  1.85  Iran  −1.19
Table  13  Hofstede’s  cross-cultural  dimensions.
Source  http://geert-hofstede.com/national-
culture.html
Researchers Geert  Hofstede,  Michel  Bond  and
Michel  Minkov
Time  availability Scores  are  time  invariant  per
dimension  and  country
Geographic  scope  93  countries  (2010)
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uncertainty  avoidance  deﬁnes  the  extent  to  which  societies
avoid  uncertainty  by  reliance  on  social  norms;  (2)  power  dis-
tance  shows  the  degree  to  which  members  of  a  society  agree
that  power  should  be  unequally  distributed;  (3)  institutionalDimensions  6
Overall  Index  No
gratiﬁcation  of  needs  by  strict  social  norms  (restraint).
Therefore,  a  country  with  high  scores  in  these  six  cul-
tural  dimensions  would  be  characterized  by  (1)  an  unequal
distribution  of  power;  (2)  intolerance  of  uncertainty  and
ambiguity;  (3)  individualism;  (4)  masculinity;  (5)  long-term
orientation;  and  (6)  indulgence.
If  we  calculate  descriptive  statistics  for  the  six  dimen-
sions  (Table  14),  it  can  be  observed  that  the  average  country
has  intermediate  values.  Interestingly  there  is  only  one
signiﬁcant  correlation  over  0.50  (the  one  between  power
distance  and  uncertainty  avoidance,  whose  value  is  −0.61).
This  seems  to  imply  that  the  dimensions  are  generally  inde-
pendent,  in  contrast  to  formal  institutional  indexes  and
dimensions,  which  were  highly  correlated  in  some  cases.
The  use  of  these  dimensions  in  empirical  studies  has
focused  on  the  role  of  culture  in  topics  that  belong  to  the
Strategic  Management  domain  and  there  have  been  two
main  approaches.  The  ﬁrst  focuses  on  analysing  the  impact
of  one  or  several  dimensions  on  management  behavior.  For
instance,  Crossland  and  Hambrick  (2012)  study  15  devel-
oped  countries  and  show  that  individualism  in  a  country
i
a93
s  positively  related  to  the  managerial  discretion  of  the
rms  headquartered  in  that  country,  whereas  uncertainty
voidance  and  power  distance  are  negatively  related  to
EO  discretion.  Shao  et  al.  (2013)  show  that  the  four  initial
imensions  of  Hofstede  moderate  the  relationship  between
mployees’  perceptions  of  justice  and  organizational  out-
omes  such  as  satisfaction  and  commitment.
The  second  approach  is  based  on  analysing  the  effect
f  cultural  indicators  on  ﬁrm  strategies  and  outcomes  by
omparison.  In  this  line  the  literature  has  used  Hofstede’s
imensions  to  calculate  different  measures  of  cultural  dis-
ance.  One  of  the  most  frequent  cultural  distance  measures
ased  on  Hofstede’s  dimensions  is  proposed  by  Kogut  and
ingh  (1988),8 and  is  calculated  as  follows:
Dj =
∑6
i=1((Iij −  Iiu)2)/Vi
6
here  Iij (Iij) is  the  score  of  dimension  i  (i  =  1,.  .  .,6)  for
ountry  j(u)  and  Vi is  the  variance  of  dimension  i.  Cul-
ural  distance  based  on  Hofstede’s  indicators  has  been  used
n  the  analysis  of  a  long  list  of  research  topics,  mainly
elated  to  the  internationalization  process  of  multination-
ls.  As  examples,  Chang  and  Rosenzweig  (2001)  show  that
oint  ventures  are  preferred  over  greenﬁeld  and  acquisition
odes  to  enter  into  the  United  States  when  the  cultural
istance  is  high.  Chakrabarti  et  al.  (2009)  analyze  cross-
order  acquisitions  involving  37  countries  and  show  that
ross-border  acquisitions  perform  better  in  the  long  run
hen  the  acquirer  and  the  target  come  from  countries  with
igher  cultural  distance.  As  well  as  being  a  key  independent
ariable,  cultural  distance  between  home  and  host  countries
as  become  one  of  the  most  frequent  control  variables
n  international  studies  that  analyze  MNEs’  strategies  and
utcomes.
lobal  Leadership  and  Organizational  Behavior
ffectiveness  (GLOBE)
he  GLOBE  project  is  a  research  program  involving  over  160
esearchers  from  many  parts  of  the  world,  conceived  by
obert  J.  House  in  1991  and  initiated  in  1993  (Table  15).
t  focuses  on  understanding  the  impact  of  culture  on  lead-
rship  and  organizational  processes.  The  project  examines
ational  cultures  through  a  survey  answered  by  middle
anagers  from  food  processing,  ﬁnancial  and  telecommuni-
ations  service  industries  and  working  in  62  countries  (House
t  al.,  2004,  2006).
GLOBE  distinguishes  cultural  practices,  that  is,  practices
hat  individuals  carry  out  de  facto  (‘‘as  is’’),  from  cultural
alues,  that  is,  practices  that  individuals  should  carry  out
‘‘should  be’’).  There  are  nine  dimensions  each  for  both
ractices  and  values,  which  are  described  as  follows:  (1)8 In the original work of Kogut and Singh (1988), cultural distance
s calculated for the four dimensions of the Hofstede Index that were
vailable and that we have adapted to the six currently available.
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Table  14  Descriptive  statistics  and  correlations  (Hofstede).a
Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6
1.Power  distance  71  59.11  21.65  11  104  --
2.Uncertainty  avoidance  71  44.39  24.00  6  91  −0.61* --
3.Individualism  vs  Collectivism  71  49.51  20.12  5  110  0.14  0.09  --
4.Masculinity  vs  Femininity  71  67.55  23.48  8  112  0.23  −0.22  −0.07  --
5.Long vs  Short-term  orientation  93  46.41  24.41  0  100  0.07  0.10  0.04  −0.02  --
6.Indulgence  vs.  restraint 93  45.87  22.84  0  100  −0.27  0.19  0.11  −0.07  −0.39* --
a We have exclusively focused on country scores and not on region sc
* p < 0.01.
Table  15  GLOBE  dimensions.
Source  http://business.nmsu.edu/
programs-centers/globe/instruments/
Researcher  Robert  J.  House
Time  availability  Scores  are  time  invariant  per
dimension  and  country
Geographic  scope  62  countries
Dimensions  18  (9  of  practices,  9  of  values)
Overall  index  No
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avoidance  (Venaik  and  Brewer,  2010).
Second,  Hofstede  and  GLOBE  do  not  use  the  same  scalesollectivism  reﬂects  the  extent  to  which  a  society  encour-
ges  collective  actions,  as  well  as  the  collective  distribution
f  resources;  (4)  in-group  collectivism  considers  the  degree
o  which  individuals  express  loyalty  and  cohesiveness  in
heir  families  or  organizations;  (5)  gender  egalitarianism
hows  the  degree  to  which  a  society  minimizes  gender  dis-
rimination;  (6)  assertiveness  reﬂects  the  extent  to  which
ndividuals  are  able  to  express  their  opinions;  (7)  future
rientation  considers  the  degree  to  which  individuals  are
ngaged  in  future-oriented  behaviors;  (8)  performance  ori-
ntation  refers  to  the  degree  to  which  a  society  encourages
ndividuals  to  improve  their  performance;  and  (9)  humane
rientation  measures  the  extent  to  which  a  society  or  orga-
ization  rewards  individuals  for  being  fair,  altruistic  and
enerous.
Table  16  shows  the  descriptive  statistics  and  correlations
f  the  cultural  dimensions  of  practices  and  values  considered
y  GLOBE.  As  can  be  observed,  although  GLOBE  dimensions
resent  higher  signiﬁcant  correlations  in  comparison  with
ofstede’s,  they  are  generally  moderate.
GLOBE’s  dimensions  have  been  used  by  previous  litera-
ure  in  similar  ways  to  Hofstede’s  indicators.  For  instance,
artin  et  al.  (2007)  analyze  the  impact  of  performance  ori-
ntation,  human  orientation  and  in-group  collectivism  on
ocal  ﬁrm  bribery  activity,  ﬁnding  that  only  in-group  collec-
ivism  is  negatively  related  to  it.  Other  studies  calculate
ultural  distance  through  Kogut  and  Singh’s  (1988)  formula
y  using  GLOBE  dimensions  and  employ  this  variable  for  sim-
lar  purposes  as  Hofstede’s  indicators.  As  an  example,  Reus
nd  Lamont  (2009)  focus  on  US  multinational  ﬁrms  and  show
hat,  in  international  acquisitions,  cultural  distance  based
n  GLOBE  constrains  communication  between  the  acquirers
nd  their  acquired  units  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  provides
ore  learning  opportunities.
a
fores.
ofstede  vs.  GLOBE
ince  the  publication  of  the  GLOBE  project,  scholars  have
een  heatedly  debating  the  validity  of  Hofstede  and  GLOBE
ndexes,  mainly  from  the  perspective  of  the  international
usiness  literature  (Brewer  and  Venaik,  2011;  Maseland  and
an  Hoorn,  2009;  Smith,  2006).  In  spite  of  this  discus-
ion,  there  is  no  unanimity  as  to  which  index  is  superior.
ables  17a  and  17b  show  correlations  between  Hofstede  and
LOBE  dimensions  for  both  practices  and  values.  The  com-
arison  of  the  two  indexes  shows  that  cultural  dimensions
hat  have  similar  names  do  not  present  high  correlations
nd,  apparently,  are  not  measuring  the  same  reality.  As
an  be  observed,  the  correlations  are  generally  moderate
nd  nonsigniﬁcant,  although  there  are  some  exceptions.
hese  exceptions  sometimes  coincide  with  dimensions  that
ave  similar  meanings  in  Hofstede’s  dimensions  and  GLOBE’s
ractices,  such  as  (1)  uncertainty  avoidance  (−0.68),  (2)
ndividualism  vs.  collectivism  (−0.73)  and  (3)  power  dis-
ance  (0.50),  and  in  Hofstede  and  GLOBE’s  values,  such
s  (4)  future  orientation  (−0.41)  and  (5)  individualism  vs.
ollectivism  (−0.52).  However,  these  high  correlations  are
lso  found  between  pairs  of  dimensions  that  differ  in  their
ames.  This  is  the  case  for  (1)  uncertainty  avoidance  (Hof-
tede)  and  future  orientation  (GLOBE  practices)  (−0.65)
nd  for  (2)  individualism  vs.  collectivism  (Hofstede)  and
ncertainty  avoidance  (GLOBE  values)  (−0.72),  to  give  just
 couple  of  examples.  This  situation  has  been  highlighted
y  Javidan  et  al.  (2006)  as  a  response  to  the  claim  that
LOBE  only  replicates  the  ﬁve  cultural  dimensions  presented
y  Hofstede  (2006).
According  to  the  evidence  presented  in  this  paper,  it
eems  that  both  Hofstede  and  GLOBE  differ  in  their  mea-
urement  of  the  underlying  variables  and  the  literature  has
ffered  several  reasons  for  these  divergences.  First,  GLOBE
onsiders  a  greater  number  of  cultural  dimensions  than
ofstede,  which,  in  practice,  implies  that  one  dimension
f  Hofstede  might  be  explained  by  several  dimensions  of
LOBE.  For  instance,  the  individualism  vs.  collectivism  of
ofstede  would  correspond  to  institutional  collectivism  and
n-group  collectivism  in  GLOBE  (Venaik  and  Brewer,  2010).
owever,  in  the  cases  in  which  the  name  of  the  dimension
nd  the  underlying  concept  are  the  same,  the  way  in  which
he  question  is  posited  is  sometimes  different.  This  is,  for
xample,  the  case  of  the  variable  measuring  uncertaintynd  questions  in  their  surveys.  There  are  two  main  dif-
erences  in  this  sense.  Whereas  GLOBE  includes  questions
The  institution-based  view  of  strategy:  How  to  measure  it  95
Table  16  Descriptive  statistics  and  correlations  (GLOBE).
Cultural  practices
Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
1.Uncertainty
avoidance
62  4.17  0.60  2.88  5.37  1.00
2.Future
orientation
62 3.84  0.46  2.88  5.07  0.75* 1.00
3.Power
distance
62 5.14  0.45  3.59  5.80  −0.48* −0.44* 1.00
4.Institutional
collectivism
62 4.24  0.43  3.25  5.22  0.38* 0.46* −0.30  1.00
5.Humane
orientation
62 4.09  0.46  3.18  5.23  0.01  0.07  −0.15  0.41* 1.00
6.Performance
orientation
62 4.10  0.41  3.20  4.94  0.58* 0.62* −0.33* 0.42* 0.25  1.00
7.In-group
collectivism
62 5.10  0.76  3.18  6.36  −0.59* −0.40* 0.61* −0.11  0.27  −0.11  1.00
8.Gender egali-
tarianism
62  3.38  0.37  2.50  4.08  −0.06  −0.07  −0.32  −0.03  −0.14  −0.30  −0.23  1.00
9.Assertiveness  62  4.13  0.37  3.38  4.89  −0.08  0.08  0.21  −0.38* −0.42* 0.05  0.13  −0.10  1.00
Cultural values
Obs.  Mean  S.D.  Min  Max  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9
1.Uncertainty
avoidance
62  4.61  0.61  3.16  5.61  1.00
2.Future
orientation
62 5.44  0.51  2.95  6.20  0.64* 1.00
3.Power
distance
62  2.77  0.40  2.04  4.35  0.04  −0.36* 1.00
4.Institutional
collectivism
62 4.71  0.50  3.83  5.65  0.45* 0.50* −0.37* 1.00
5.Humane
orientation
62 5.39  0.36  3.39  6.09  0.02  0.38* −0.62* 0.07  1.00
6.Performance
orientation
62 5.88  0.56  2.35  6.58  0.25  0.69* −0.61* 0.43* 0.61* 1.00
7.In-group
collectivism
62 5.64 0.41 4.06  6.52  0.35* 0.66* −0.42* 0.36* 0.27  0.70* 1.00
8.Gender egali-
tarianism
62  4.50  0.49  3.18  5.17  −0.49* −0.16  −0.51* 0.00  0.28  0.28  0.21  1.00
9.Assertiveness  62  3.83  0.64  2.66  5.56  0.19  0.03  0.29  −0.22  −0.12  −0.06  −0.02  −0.29  1.00
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e* p < 0.01.
referring  to  both  practices  (‘‘as  is’’)  and  values  (‘‘should
be’’),  Hofstede  considers  that  practices  are  determined
by  values  and,  thus,  only  includes  questions  about  val-
ues.  Moreover,  Hofstede  questionnaires  ask  each  individual
about  his/her  personal  perceptions  about  cultural  dimen-
sions,  whereas  GLOBE  asks  about  society  perceptions  of
cultural  dimensions  (Javidan  et  al.,  2006;  Maseland  and  Van
Hoorn,  2009).
Third,  Hofstede’s  dimensions  are  based  on  surveys  to
managers  of  the  same  multinational  (IBM),  whereas  GLOBE’s
dimensions  have  been  calculated  on  the  basis  of  surveys  to
managers  of  more  diverse  origin.  Moreover,  the  time  of  data
collection  differs  between  Hofstede  and  GLOBE.  Whereas
Hofstede  started  his  project  at  the  beginning  of  the  1970s
and  included  new  dimensions  in  1991  and  2010,  GLOBE
i
s
g
jtarted  in  the  mid-1990s.  Therefore,  the  cultural  changes
hat  might  have  taken  place  from  the  1970s  to  the  1990s  and
rom  the  1990s  to  now  could  also  explain  the  divergences
etween  the  two  studies.
In  sum,  two  main  cultural  indexes  may  be  used  by
trategic  Management  scholars  to  include  informal  insti-
utions  in  their  empirical  analysis,  namely,  Hofstede’s  and
LOBE’s.  There  is  much  discussion,  based  on  their  diver-
ences,  about  which  proposal  is  superior.  These  divergences
an  be  explained  by  the  structure  of  the  survey,  the  differ-
nt  questions  posited  (even  when  the  name  of  the  variable
s  the  same),  the  sample  and  the  time  at  which  these
tudies  were  conducted.  Even  admitting  that  these  diver-
ences  exist,  these  indexes  are  frequently  used  in  strategy
ournals.  Some  papers  have  even  carried  out  analyses  that
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Table  17a  Correlations  between  cultural  practices  of  GLOBE  and  Hofstede  scores.a
GLOBE
Cultural  practices
1.Uncertainty
avoidance
2.Future
orientation
3.Power
distance
4.Institutional
collectivism
5.Humane
orientation
6.Performance
orientation
7.In-group
collectivism
8.Gender
egalitarianism
9.Assertiveness
Hofstede
1.Power  distance  −0.41* −0.26  0.50* −0.16  0.10  −0.17  0.65* 0.04  −0.06
2.Uncertainty
avoidance
−0.68* −0.65* 0.40* −0.55* −0.44* −0.64* 0.22  0.00  0.16
3.Individualism vs
Collectivism
0.37  0.22  −0.47* 0.12  −0.14  0.10  −0.73* 0.18  0.04
4.Masculinity vs
Femininity
−0.13  −0.07  0.19  −0.11  −0.05  0.12  0.13  −0.15  0.35
5.Long vs
Short-term
orientation
0.25 0.21  −0.21  0.29  −0.31  0.23  −0.19  0.01  −0.06
6.Indulgence vs.
restraint
0.18  0.24  −0.06  −0.03  −0.08  −0.11  −0.33  0.13  0.09
a Correlations referring to dimensions with similar names are highlighted to facilitate comparison. Correlations have been calculated for countries (and societies within a country) that
are common for both indexes.
* p < 0.01.
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Table  17b  Correlations  between  cultural  values  of  GLOBE  and  Hofstede  scores.a
GLOBE
Cultural  values
1.Uncertainty
avoidance
2.Future
orientation
3.Power
distance
4.Institutional
collectivism
5.Humane
orientation
6.Performance
orientation
7.In-group
collectivism
8.Gender
egalitarianism
9.Assertiveness
Hofstede
1.Power  distance 0.66* 0.38* 0.01  0.33  −0.06  0.08  0.12  −0.42* 0.28
2.Uncertainty avoidance 0.29 0.15 −0.31  0.32  −0.09  0.03  0.15  0.09  −0.39*
3.Individualism  vs  Collectivism −0.72* −0.39* 0.14 −0.52* 0.09 −0.13 −0.23 0.35  −0.16
4.Masculinity vs  Femininity 0.08 0.11 0.09 0.01 0.01 0.03 −0.10  −0.05  0.17
5.Long vs  Short-term  orientation−0.26 −0.41* 0.16 −0.38* −0.10 −0.46* −0.59* −0.09  0.08
6.Indulgence vs.  restraint −0.21 0.03 −0.34 0.21 0.17 0.29 0.41* 0.54* −0.31
a Correlations referring to dimensions with similar names are highlighted to facilitate comparison. Correlations have been calculated for countries (and societies within a country) that
are common for both indexes.
* p < 0.01.
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ake  both  measures  into  account  in  order  to  determine  the
obustness  of  their  results  (Hutzschenreuter  and  Voll,  2008;
utzschenreuter  et  al.,  2011).
onclusions
he  objective  of  this  paper  has  been  to  provide  a  useful  tool
or  strategy  scholars  interested  in  incorporating  the  institu-
ional  dimension  of  strategy  into  their  research.  Our  main
ontribution  has  been  to  identify  the  different  alternatives
vailable  to  measure  formal  and  informal  institutions,  the
elationship  between  them  and  some  guidance  about  their
se  in  empirical  work.  We  have  focused  on  the  information
hat  is  more  easily  available  to  the  researcher,  that  provided
y  worldwide  public  sources.  Although  there  is  no  doubt  that
his  selection  of  these  measures  is,  in  some  ways,  arbitrary,
t  can  be  justiﬁed  by  their  ability  to  capture  the  formal
nd  informal  dimensions  into  which  the  institutional  char-
cteristics  of  the  environment  may  be  divided,  and  by  the
requency  with  which  they  have  been  used  in  the  past.
The  paper  offers  two  main  groups  of  conclusions.  The  ﬁrst
s  related  to  the  idea  that  the  opportunities  for  research
n  the  intersection  between  strategic  management  and  the
nstitution-based  view  seem  to  be  promising.  From  the  the-
retical  point  of  view,  the  institution-based  view  provides
esearchers  with  enough  arguments  for  it  to  become  a
ource  of  inspiration  for  Strategic  Management,  given  that
t  directly  tackles  the  questions  that  deﬁne  its  domain.  Of
pecial  interest  is  its  potential  power  to  explain  why  ﬁrm
erformance  differs.  The  idea  that  institutions  not  only
ondition  the  different  solutions  offered  to  organizational
roblems,  but  that  they  also  may  be  inﬂuenced  by  ﬁrms
o  obtain  ‘‘inﬂuence  rents’’  also  seems  to  contribute  to
hat  explanation,  widening  the  applicability  of  the  theory.
hether  inﬂuence  rents  will  become  the  ‘‘standard  ﬁfth
ype’’  of  rents,  at  the  same  level  as  efﬁciency,  monopo-
istic,  Schumpeterian  or  quasi-rents,  is  a  question  that  will
emain  open  for  some  time  and  that  also  depends  on  the
nterest  the  subject  raises.  The  fact  that  all  ﬁrms  are  embed-
ed  in  societal  systems  also  seems  to  evidence  its  potential
pplicability.
From  the  empirical  point  of  view,  although  with  some
xceptions,  the  existing  evidence  has  centered  on  the  anal-
sis  of  international  businesses.  Although  there  is  no  doubt
hat  the  international  context  is  one  of  the  natural  places  in
hich  the  theory  could  be  applied,  the  literature  suggests
ther  avenues  for  research  as  may  also  be  derived  from  the
nalysis  above.  One  of  them  is  to  further  explore  the  varia-
ion  in  institutions  between  different  countries,  even  if  the
rms  considered  are  not  executing  an  international  busi-
ess  strategy.  Up  to  now,  research  has  focused  on  emerging
conomies,  losing  the  opportunity  to  explore  the  differences
etween  developed  and  non-developed  countries.  These  dif-
erences  not  only  affect  our  understanding  of  the  strategies
nd  performance  of  international  ﬁrms  when  going  abroad,
ut  they  also  help  us  to  understand  why  similar  strate-
ies  may  offer  different  results  in  different  institutional
ontexts.  In  this  line,  we  have  observed  that  the  institution-
ased  view  has  already  been  used  in  a  wide  variety  of
ontexts  seeking  to  analyze,  for  instance,  the  role  of  insti-
utions  in  explaining  product  diversiﬁcation  or  entry  mode
i
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trategies.  However,  there  is  still  a  range  of  topics  to  which
he  theory  may  be  applied.  This  paper  suggests  the  analysis
f  ﬁrst-mover  advantages  or  multimarket  competition  the-
ry  as  future  arenas  where  the  intersection  between  existing
heories  and  the  institution-based  view  could  give  us  a  more
uanced  picture  of  these  phenomena.
The  second  group  of  conclusions  relates  to  the  main
bjective  of  the  paper,  which  has  been  to  provide
esearchers  with  a  view  of  the  variables  that  capture  the
nstitutional  environment  within  which  ﬁrms  operate  and
hat  may  condition  their  performance.  First,  we  have  pro-
ided  clear  evidence  of  the  feasibility  of  measuring  the
ifferent  dimensions  that  deﬁne  the  institutional  environ-
ent,  given  the  existence  of  publicly  available  information.
econd,  we  have  studied  a  selected  set  of  variables  that
efer  to  the  two  main  types  of  institutions  that  are  fre-
uently  distinguished,  offering  a  brief  description  of  each
f  them  and  analysing  their  interrelations.  Regarding  for-
al  institutions,  we  have  focused  our  attention  on  the  Index
f  Economic  Freedom,  the  Political  Constraints  Index,  the
orruption  Perception  Index  and  the  Worldwide  Governance
ndicators.  The  correlations  between  some  of  these  four
ndexes  and,  sometimes,  between  their  components  are  high
nough  to  make  us  think  that  the  underlying  concept  they
re  measuring  is  very  similar.  Importantly,  when  a  factorial
nalysis  is  performed,  all  the  variables  are  reduced  to  one
actor,  apparently  indicating  that  they  are  measuring  the
ame  underlying  construct.  From  this  evidence,  our  advice
o  researchers  is  to  bear  in  mind  that  when  measuring  for-
al  institutions,  most  of  the  analyzed  alternatives  point  in
he  same  direction.
A  similar  analysis  has  been  performed  to  understand  the
ariables  proposed  to  measure  the  informal  dimension  of
nstitutions.  In  this  case,  the  sources  of  the  data  are  Hofst-
de’s  study  of  culture  and  the  GLOBE  project.  The  main  issue
o  highlight  is  that,  although  both  studies  attempt  to  mea-
ure  the  same  underlying  dimension,  they  achieve  this  task
ery  differently  and  with  a certain  degree  of  contradiction.
irst,  they  differ  in  the  number  of  underlying  dimensions,
he  way  the  different  questions  are  posited,  the  sources  of
he  information  provided  and  the  timing.  Second,  and  per-
aps  most  important  in  terms  of  potential  confusion,  the
imensions  that  are  similarly  named  are  sometimes  very
ifﬁcult  to  conciliate  and  seem  to  be  measuring  different
nderlying  dimensions.  Our  comparison  of  the  Hofstede  and
LOBE  measures  not  only  conﬁrms  this  by  sometimes  even
howing  negative  correlations  between  similarly  named
imensions,  but  also  that  there  are  some  unexpectedly  high
orrelations  between  apparently  different  measures.  There-
ore,  researchers  incorporating  the  institution-based  view
re  advised  to  be  very  careful  when  selecting  the  variable
f  informal  institutions  that  best  ﬁts  their  theory.  We  sug-
est  going  directly  to  the  source,  either  Hofstede  or  GLOBE,
nd  understanding  the  meaning  underlying  each  dimension
n  order  to  be  more  precise  when  selecting  the  measure.
t  is  not  only  important  to  empirically  justify  the  choice  of
ne  particular  alternative,  but  also  to  theoretically  argue  in
avor  of  the  relationship  between  the  theory  used  and  the
nformal  dimension  analyzed.
In  sum,  this  paper  aimed  to  contribute  to  the  consoli-
ation  of  the  institution-based  view  by  presenting  a  guide
or  researchers  for  incorporating  the  institutional  dimension
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into  their  works.  This  is  just  a  ﬁrst  attempt;  there  is  still  a
long  way  to  go  in  integrating  the  extant  Strategic  Manage-
ment  theories  and  this  new  and  promising  perspective.
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